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2(b) OR NOT 2(b): FIFTY YEARS OF
QUESTIONS-THE PRACTICAL




EW aspects of the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund1 (the "Bretton Woods Agreement" or "the Agreement")
fit as well with the theme of this symposium as does the practical applica-
tion of Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Agreement. Particularly from the
point of view of a German legal scholar and practitioner, section 2(b)
presents some very interesting and complex problems not only of public
international law, but also of national law and in particular conflict of
laws.
This essay first traces the origin and framework of section 2(b), and
then examines some of the main issues involved in interpreting the sec-
tion. After delving into the main elements of section 2(b), it discusses
German law, which has a certain specific jurisprudence with regard to
section 2(b). Finally, it concludes with some new directions.
I. THE NATURE OF SECTION 2(b)
Interpretation of section 2(b) is greatly complicated by the fact that
the clause is contained in a multilateral agreement under public interna-
tional law that was drafted in a very short period of time, and then only
in the English language, which is uncommon with multilateral docu-
ments. I believe that it was drafted within two or three days, and in a
peculiar type of language which resembles neither that of the common
* Address given by Dr. Gerhard Wegen on February 24, 1994 as part of the
Fordham University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1993-1994.
** Gerhard Wegen is a member of the German and New York Bars, and a partner in
the firm of Gleiss Lutz Hootz Hirsch & Partners, Stuttgart, Germany. Holder of a Doc-
torate of Law from the University of Tiibingen and an LL.M. from Harvard Law School,
he is also registered as a Foreign Attorney in Brussels. Dr. Wegen is an Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Tiibingen, and frequently lectures on corporate and secur-
ities law before professional groups in Europe and North America. He is Vice Chairman
of Committee Q of the Capital Markets Forum of the International Bar Association, and
has published numerous books and articles. He practices primarily in the areas of arbi-
tration and litigation, corporate law, financial services, international law, and mergers
and acquisitions.
The author expresses his gratitude to Christopher Kuner, LL.M., associate of Gleiss
Lutz Hootz Hirsch & Partners, for editing this speech for publication.
1. See Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203 [hereinafter Articles of Agreement].
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law lawyer nor that of the continental lawyer. The first sentence of sec-
tion 2(b) states:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member
maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unen-
forceable in the territories of any member.2
It is worthwhile to compare non-official German and French versions.
The unofficial German text reads:
Aus Devisenkontrakten, welche die Wihrung eines Mitglieds beriihren
und den von diesem Mitglied in Ubereinstimmung mit diesem Uber-
einkommen aufrechterhaltenen oder eingefiihrten Devisenkon-
trollbestimmungen zuwiderlaufen, kann in den Hoheitsgebieten der
Mitglieder nicht geklagt werden.3
A French translation, upon which the Belgian, French, and Swiss au-
thorities agreed, reads:
Les contrats relatifs aux devises qui portent sur la monnaie d'un mem-
bre et qui sont en opposition avec la r6glementation du contr6le des
changes de ce membre maintenue ou impos6e conform6ment au pr6s-
ent accord n'auront pas force obligatoire dans les territoires de tout
membre.
4
It is obvious that while the English version talks about "exchange con-
tracts which are unenforceable," the German version says "contracts
which cannot be put before the court," and the French version says
"contracts which have no binding force." Therefore, on the very basic
level of language, the various versions are inconsistent. Adding to this
difficulty, no single international court interprets this clause, and thus no
one single authoritative interpreter exists.
It is also important to realize that different countries may view this
clause in different ways. On the one hand, a court might judge the clause
under principles of public international law, which are typically used to
interpret the instruments of public international law, and which are fa-
miliar to public international lawyers. On the other hand, a court may
evaluate it under a conflict of laws approach (or "private international
law," as we continental lawyers call it) as a question of what law to apply
to a transaction, or which substantive law holds contracts to be
unenforceable. -
The distinction between public law and private law, which is very pro-
nounced in the German system, is also relevant to interpreting section
2(b) with regard to national exchange control regulations. The section
might be considered to fall either under public law as an exchange con-
trol regulation imposed by the state, or under private law because it pro-
2. Id. art. VIII § 2(b).
3. This version appears in Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGBI.II] 1978, 13, 34-35.
4. This translation is quoted in 3 Sir Joseph Gold, The Fund Agreement in the
Courts 629 (1986).
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vides that private contracts may be found unenforceable. Elements of
public policy further complicate the construction of section 2(b). These
elements include protecting the forum state's status as a financial center
and safeguarding the rights of both debtors and creditors.
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGREEMENT
The purpose of the Bretton Woods Agreement was international mon-
etary cooperation. It was, and remains, this century's most important
agreement for regulating the international monetary system. Another
important factor is the membership of the Agreement. While today over
170 member states participate in the Bretton Woods Agreement, there
also has been a certain fluctuation in its membership; for instance, some
socialist countries traditionally did not participate in it for political rea-
sons, or opted out of it after adopting socialism (one example is Cuba).
Other states did not join because they wanted to remain neutral (for ex-
ample, Switzerland). Today's membership, however, is so vast that in
almost all countries of the world, section 2(b) must be taken into
account.
As previously stated, the Agreement is a multilateral agreement under
public international law, which creates obligations between states. It op-
erates on the interstate level only, and therefore does not create obliga-
tions between states and private individuals. Yet, as will be discussed
later, it is of enormous importance to both individuals and corporations.
As mentioned above,5 the Agreement's unilingual nature makes ascer-
tainment of its meaning even more difficult.6 Normally, such agreements
are drafted in five to seven languages, which permits comparison between
the texts to discern meaning. Obviously, this is impossible in the case of
the Agreement.
Even though the Bretton Woods Agreement is a treaty under public
international law, one of its main purposes was to deal, for the first time,
with exchange control regulations on a private basis. Prior to Bretton
Woods, exchange control regulations were looked at from a perspective
of public law only. The so-called "revenue rule" has traditionally pro-
vided that rules of public law are only applicable within the territory of
the state in which they were created, and do not have extra-territorial
application.7 The parties to the Bretton Woods Agreement, however,
wanted to establish a regime in which exchange control regulations of
one state could be enforced in other states. In other words, section 2(b)
5. See supra text accompanying note 2.
6. For a discussion of the relationship between treaty interpretation and the lan-
guage(s) in which it is drafted, see Christopher B. Kuner, The Interpretation of Multil-
ingual Treaties. Comparison of Texts versus the Presumption of Similar Meaning, 40 Int'l
& Comp. L.Q. 953 (1991).




is intended to establish extra-territorial recognition of foreign exchange
controls in the member states to the International Monetary Fund.
Of course, in order to make section 2(b) effective with regard to indi-
viduals, it was necessary to implement it in the national legal systems of
each member state. This was accomplished by obligating the member
states in the Agreement to do so in such a way that it would be enforced
in their legal systems.' Implementation of a rule that is contained in a
multilateral agreement under public international law can be accom-
plished in different ways. One alternative is simply to enact the text into
national law. The second alternative is to state in national law that Arti-
cle VIII, section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement will be given ef-
fect within the country. The third alternative is to ratify the Agreement
and leave open the specific means for providing for its effectiveness in the
country. The United States, which falls into the second category, deals
with the problem through section 11 of the Bretton Woods Agreement
Act of 1945:
The provisions of article IX, sections 2 to 9, both inclusive, and the
first sentence of article VIII, section 2(b), of the Articles of Agreement
of the Fund... shall have full force and effect in the United States and
its Territories and possessions upon acceptance of membership by the
United States in, and the establishment of, the Fund and the Bank,
respectively. 9
By contrast, in states such as Australia, Mexico, and Sweden, it is still
not clear from the ratification process whether Article VIII, section 2(b)
was actually adopted into domestic law."° It could be argued, however,
that such implementation is not actually necessary because the states fall-
ing into this category have ratified the instruments as such.
A consequence of adoption into domestic law is that, although enacted
on an international level, no international court has jurisdiction to inter-
pret section 2(b). Instead, it is the national courts of the member states
which have construed it. The writings of scholars such as Sir Joseph
Gold," I F.A. Mann,' 2 Professor Arthur Nussbaum, I3 and, most recently,
8. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XX § 2a; Werner F. Ebke, Article
VIII Section 2(b), International Monetary Cooperation, and the Courts, 23 Int'l Law. 677,
684 & n.39 (1989) [hereinafter International Monetary Cooperation].
9. 22 U.S.C. § 286h (1988).
10. For a discussion regarding the legal status of § 2(b) in these three countries, see
Werner F. Ebke, Internationales Devisenrecht 162-63 (1991) [hereinafter Internationales
Devisenrecht].
11. See Gold, supra note 4; Sir Joseph Gold, Exchange Rates in International Law
and Organization (1988); Sir Joseph Gold, Developments in the International Monetary
System, the International Monetary Fund, and International Monetary Law since 1971,
174 Recueil des Cours 107 (1982).
12. See Frederick A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money (5th ed. 1992).
13. See Arthur Nussbaum, Money in the Law, National and International (2d ed.
1950).
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Professor Werner Ebke'4 have also impacted greatly on the clause's in-
terpretation; this is one of the few instances where scholarly writing has
impacted national jurisprudence directly. Indeed, it is mainly due to
such scholars that the courts have become aware of the clause at all.
Turning now to case law, in many instances over the last fifty years
courts have simply disregarded the rules on a systematic level because
neither the parties, counsel, nor the court thought of invoking section
2(b). Thus, it is difficult to assess the true applicability of the clause. In
the early years, there was a great reluctance to deal with the clause at all.
In the United States, the first wave of cases came about due to war-re-
lated immigration matters, in which U.S. institutions sued non-U.S. citi-
zens, or vice-versa. 5 The second series of cases developed around the
Cuban socialist revolution, in particular the so-called Cuban insurance
cases.' 6 Since the late 1970s, the clause has become very important in
international finance transactions, particularly those involving U.S. citi-
zens dealing with foreign banks and foreign countries.' European case
law, including Germany's, developed mainly in international trade
cases. 8 Thus, a certain case law did develop in all major jurisdictions.
But no cases appear to have arisen in smaller countries, such as Switzer-
land, which of course is an important jurisdiction in international bank-
ing transactions.
III. ISSUES WITH REGARD TO THE INTERPRETATION
OF SECTION 2(b)
The first issue concerning section 2(b)'s interpretation is how to char-
acterize it-that is, whether it should be considered a rule of conflict of
laws or a rule of substantive law. In Germany, the question also arises
whether it is a rule of civil procedure or of substantive law. In general,
section 2(b) has characteristics of its own that impact public law, private
law, and substantive law.
Germany characterizes section 2(b) in accordance with the law of each
member state that applies it. Because section 2(b) has been implemented
into the laws of the various member states on a domestic level, Germans
14. For a detailed study which has begun to impact German jurisprudence on the
subject, see Internationales Devisenrecht, supra note 10.
15. See eg., Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 160 N.E.2d 836
(N.Y.) (resolving a contract dispute between Italian concerns and an American bank,
which implicated foreign exchange regulations of the Bretton Woods Agreement), cert.
denied 361 U.S. 895 (1959); Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 110
N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1953) (deciding a suit between a U.S. citizen and a Czech bank); Cermak
v. Bata Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (deciding an action by
U.S. assignees to recover a deposit from a Czech corporation), aff'd, 90 N.Y.S.2d 680
(App. Div. 1949).
16. See Varas v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 203 A.2d 505 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964), cerL de-
nied, 382 U.S. 827 (1965).
17. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
18. See Internationales Devisenrecht, supra note 10, at 173.
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leave its characterization to the respective legal system that applies in a
particular case. Thus, German law views section 2(b) as a conflict of
laws rule that preempts rules for special statutory choice of law and gen-
eral conflict of laws. 19 On the other hand, it could also be characterized
under German law as a substantive law rule with procedural implica-
tions. As a choice of law rule, section 2(b) preempts other choice of law
rules. In Germany, "due regard for the foreign exchange regulations of
other countries" means that when such regulations are in place and in
conformity with the Agreement, German public policy will not be in-
voked to disregard them. German law will, therefore, construe duly-
promulgated foreign exchange control regulations to hold contracts un-
enforceable when appropriate; no recourse may be had to other German
conflict of laws rules.
While this question may seem fairly esoteric, it actually has important
practical consequences. Construing section 2(b) as a conflict of laws rule
requires the application of the exchange control regulations of third
states in Germany. But then the question arises as to what the legal
consequences are when the rule ceases to be in force. For instance, a
contract may be concluded under a foreign exchange control regulation
which is later revoked by the state. Thus, at the time the contract was
concluded, it was contrary to the foreign exchange control regulations of
another state, but is no longer so. If section 2(b) is considered a rule of
substantive law, however, then two alternatives exist: either the contract
will be considered invalid and unenforceable from the beginning, or the
exchange control regulation constitutes a condition which was present
but has now disappeared, so that the contract was unenforceable but has
now become enforceable.
In the United States, courts have sometimes refused to enforce con-
tracts that are contrary to the exchange control regulations of other
countries not based on the language of section 2(b), but on the act of
state doctrine.2 ° This is uncommon for us on the Continent of Europe,
because we do not recognize an act of state doctrine to the same extent as
the United States. Another important question that sometimes arises is
whether a member state's public policy considerations may override sec-
tion 2(b). The basic problem in this regard is whether foreign exchange
control regulations may be denied enforcement in the forum state based
on that state's public policy.
Although no German case has been decided on this point, Germans
would argue that once section 2(b) finds an application, the public policy
of the forum state cannot override it. It could, however, be argued that
19. See International Monetary Cooperation, supra note 8, at 684.
20. See, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp.
1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding the act of state doctrine as meritorious in defending
against a suit for a loan default), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934-
35 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see Ricki R. Tigert, Allied Bank International: A
United States Government Perspective, 17 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 511 (1985).
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public policy should come into play where basic notions of justice and
fairness are concerned; one example would be when foreign exchange
control regulations of another state are promulgated in conformity with
the Agreement, but violate basic notions of justice recognized in Ger-
many, such as discrimination on the basis of race or religion. It is also
important to note that because German statutes of limitation are a part
of the substantive law, section 2(b) may apply when the substantive law
applies.
Another problem that arises concerns arbitrability-that is, whether
the parties can submit to arbitration the question of whether a contract is
an exchange contract under Article VIII, section 2(b), and whether sec-
tion 2(b) should be taken into account by arbitral tribunals. There has
been some debate on this issue, and a case has even come up before the
International Chamber of Commerce.2 Though in that case the arbitral
tribunal unfortunately misconstrued the nature of section 2(b) and stated
that it should only apply to state contracts, 22 it is generally accepted that
arbitral tribunals should take note of section 2(b) if the facts indicate that
section 2(b) may be involved. Thus, the arbitral tribunal should raise the
issue on its own motion if it is appropriate, even if the parties do not raise
it.
Finally, questions arise under section 2(b) with regard to the recogni-
tion and enforcement ofjudgments. For example, in an English case, the
court took the position that only currency contracts, i.e., contracts to
exchange one currency against another, could be considered exchange
contracts. 23 That case concerned a futures contract. The English plain-
tiff, a brokerage firm, prevailed against an Italian defendant. As the Ital-
ian defendant had no assets in England, the English plaintiff attempted to
enforce the judgment in Italy, but the Italian court refused, based on
public policy grounds and a narrow interpretation of section 2(b). Al-
most all Western legal systems recognize incompatibility with public pol-
icy as a grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF SECTION 2(b)
Six elements must be considered when interpreting section 2(b).
A. "Exchange Contracts"
This requirement has given rise to much debate and diversity of opin-
ion between the legal systems of the United States/United Kingdom and
those of continental Europe. The United States and the United King-
dom, following Professor Nussbaum's lead, define exchange contracts as
contracts that have as their subject the exchange of currency, meaning
21. This case is described in Internationales Devisenrecht, supra note 10, at 164.
22. See id.
23. See Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 703, 713 (C.A.).
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currency contracts in the narrowest sense.24 On the other hand, the con-
tinental systems, and particularly Germany, define exchange contracts as
contracts that have as their essential nature an exchange of goods or serv-
ices that has an impact on the foreign exchange reserves available in that
country.25 Thus, on the Continent, any contract for the sale of goods or
for services involving a currency and which would lead to a decrease or
increase in the foreign exchange funds of the member states is considered
an exchange contract. In this broad notion of exchange contracts, virtu-
ally all contracts between parties residing in member states potentially
have such an impact, and thus could be considered exchange contracts.
This broader interpretation, which was developed in particular by F.A.
Mann,26 seems to further the goals of the Agreement more effectively,
since it subjects more contracts to section 2(b). Thus more transactions
will have to be concerned with the foreign exchange regulations of mem-
ber states and their impact in the forum state.
In Germany, the U.S./U.K. view has traditionally been incomprehen-
sible. Germany regards contracts such as those for the sale of goods, for
services, life insurance contracts, surety contracts, guarantees, and so-
called "acknowledgments of debt" (Schuldanerkenntnisse) all as poten-
tial exchange contracts. This is also true for contracts regarding interna-
tional monetary commitment agreements and international money
collection agreements. One current problem concerns international loan
agreements. Common law courts, for instance a federal court in the
Southern District of New York, have explicitly stated that international
loan agreements are not to be considered exchange contracts, based on
their desire to maintain the position of the forum as an international fi-
nancial center.27 By contrast, Germany generally considers international
loan agreements to be exchange contracts under section 2(b),2 s which
may account for the reluctance to select the application of German law
in international loan agreements.
But a recent case indicates that the German courts are becoming
slightly more flexible with regard to the types of contracts that are con-
sidered "exchange contracts" under section 2(b). In a case involving a
Bulgarian limited partner that had attempted to rely on the provision as
grounds for refusing to pay an increased capital contribution to a Ger-
man limited partnership, the German Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) ruled for the first time that international capital
24. See International Monetary Cooperation, supra note 8, at 687.
25. See id. at 687-89.
26. See Mann, supra note 12, at 378-86.
27. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 900
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a contract to borrow U.S. currency, which requires U.S.
currency, and which designates New York as the situs of repayment, was not an ex-
change contract within the meaning of § 2(b)); see also International Monetary Coopera-
tion, supra note 8, at 687.
28. See International Monetary Cooperation, supra note 8, at 689.
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transfers do not fall under section 2(b).29
B. "Which Involve the Currency"
What does it mean to "involve a currency?" While various theories
have been advanced, suffice it to say that there must be an impact on the
actual currency reserves of the country in question. This may be defined
in various ways, such as by looking at the currency balance sheet or the
hypothetical impact of the transaction only.
C. "Of Any Member"
While it is clear that the Bretton Woods Agreement leads to the impo-
sition of legal duties on the members, the membership has increased sig-
nificantly in the fifty years since the Agreement came into force. Thus,
the enforceability of a contract under the Agreement often depends on
when the state became a member of the Agreement.
D. "'And Which Are Contrary to the Exchange Control Regulations of
that Member"
The question of whether a contract is contrary to the exchange control
regulations of the member in question must be determined by reference
to the member's national law.
E. "'Maintained or Imposed Consistently with the Agreement"
Determining whether particular exchange control regulations are
maintained or imposed consistently with the Agreement is obviously a
difficult assessment for a court to make. Since most courts, not to men-
tion most attorneys, are hardly experts in the technicalities of foreign
exchange regulations, under the Bretton Woods Agreement it is possible
to request the executive board of the International Monetary Fund to
make this assessment.3°
F. "Shall Be Unenforceable in the Territories of Any Member"
The last element is the legal consequence that such contract is unen-
forceable. Together with the question of what is an exchange contract,
this is one of the areas in which common law countries diverge most
sharply from the continental legal systems. The concept of unenforce-
ability is a common law concept deriving from the system of actions
under Roman law, and it is fairly obvious to a common law lawyer that
there are obligations or contracts which may be unenforceable in court.
29. See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1993, BGH, W. Ger., 1994 Recht der internationalen
Wirtschaft [RIW] 151; Judgment of Feb. 22, 1994, BGH, W. Ger., 1994 RIW 327.
30. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, at art. XXIX. For a discussion of this
procedure, see International Monetary Cooperation, supra note 8, at 697-98.
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This concept is difficult for a continental lawyer, who instead speaks of
the "voidness" of a contract.
Shortly after World War II, F.A. Mann, among others, proposed that
an exchange contract that violates foreign exchange regulations should
be considered void. But this result is highly questionable because foreign
exchange regulations may be imposed at one time and terminated later,
just as states may join the Agreement and then leave it later. Thus, the
problem with Mann's view is that the contract would be void ab initio,
and therefore could not be void later.
The German courts have gone in a completely different direction by
deciding that contracts which were contrary to foreign exchange control
regulations could be valid, but could not be enforced in court.31 This
view postulates the existence of a new procedural requirement for a con-
tract to be sued upon in court-that is, that it does not violate exchange
control regulations. Thus, a German court, in entertaining a suit, may
decide, either upon motion by the parties or upon its own motion, that
section 2(b) is implicated and that the contract violates it. In such a case,
the court would dismiss the suit and find the contract inadmissible on
procedural grounds; it would not reach a decision on the merits. Ger-
many's trend seems to be that such contracts should be regarded, as they
are in the common law world, as imperfect, even though they continue to
be binding obligations. The result is that there may be a kind of condi-
tional validity of the contract, i.e., that the contract may exist, but that
its existence is conditional on not being contrary to foreign exchange
control regulations.32 This concept is otherwise unknown to both conti-
nental and common law lawyers.
One important question that arises in practice concerns the status of
accessory security taken under an exchange contract which is then not
enforceable. This question also arises with regard to sureties and guaran-
ties, and with set-offs, when the claim which may be set off is unenforce-
able under section 2(b). Or, what are the consequences when one of the
parties claims damages under a contract which is declared unenforceable
under section 2(b)? All of these incidental problems are basically decided
along the same split we have seen earlier: the U.S./U.K. courts and
scholars would tend to narrowly construe section 2(b), saying that the
section applies to exchange contracts only, and not to other instruments
of international trade such as letters of credit, sureties, and the like. Ger-
man courts, however, would state that "full faith and credit" should be
given to section 2(b), and that if a contract is declared unenforceable,
then any legal transaction immediately prior to that contract must also
be unenforceable. This would also apply to a surety or guaranty which is
tainted by the contract's unenforceability.
31. See Judgment of Apr. 27, 1970, BGH, W. Ger., 1970 Wertpapiermitteilungen
[WM] 785, 786; Order of Dec. 21, 1976, BGH, W. Ger., 1976 Die deutsche Rechtssp-
rechung auf dem Gebiete des internationalen Privatrechts [IPRspr] 342, 343.
32. See Judgment of Apr. 27, 1970, BGH, W. Ger., 1970 WM 785, 786.
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V. REMAINING CONSIDERATIONS
A few matters concerning section 2(b) that are important under Ger-
man law remain. The first is the concept of enforceability as a proce-
dural requirement that the court must examine on its own motion. Up
until the time at which a judgment is rendered, the court may examine
the concept of the enforceability of a contract based on foreign exchange
controls. There are three instances of such examination in Germany:
the lower court, the appellate level, and the federal level.
Typically, section 2(b) defenses come into play at the appellate or the
federal levels only, because at these levels both counsel and the courts
tend to be more sophisticated. In many instances, defenses based on sec-
tion 2(b) are often brought in as a last resort, sometimes after many years
of litigation. It often happens that the first two levels fully litigated the
matter and made findings of fact, and then one of the parties raises the
issue of section 2(b) at the last moment at the federal level. In such a
case, the party making the submission may invoke the lack of a proce-
dural requirement (namely, that of an enforceable contract), causing the
whole case to fall apart. This is a real problem in Germany, and one
which does justice to neither the plaintiff nor the defendant.
Secondly, Germany procedurally requires the plaintiff to substantiate
and put forward all of his arguments. So section 2(b) is not viewed as a
defense that must be invoked by the defendant, but as a procedural re-
quirement requiring the plaintiff to prove its non-application.33 The
common law system, by contrast, views section 2(b) as a defense that
must be raised by the defendant.34 Under the German view, therefore, if
the plaintiff fails to substantiate its claim that the court should not apply
section 2(b), the complaint would be dismissed without the court having
reached a decision on the merits. This can have practical implications
with regard to the issuance of international bonds. Germany is a major
provider of capital in the international markets, which involves issuing
Deutsche Mark bonds under German law. If litigation is then brought
before the German courts and the plaintiff fails to meet its burden, the
bondholders are at risk of not having their money repaid. Luckily there
are signs that the situation may change in Germany, particularly due to
the scholarly work of Professor Ebke35-that is, that section 2(b) may be
looked upon as a defense which is based on the concept of an imperfect
obligation.
33. See Judgment of Apr. 27, 1970, BGH, W. Ger., 1970 WM 785, 786-87; see also
International Monetary Cooperation, supra note 8, at 700-01.
34. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 902
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that the defendant failed to sustain its burden of proof that its
currency restrictions were exempt from IMF approval requirements); see also Interna-
tional Monetary Cooperation, supra note 8, at 701.
35. For Professor Ebke's criticism of the German view, see International Monetary
Cooperation, supra note 8, at 700-03.
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CONCLUSION
Section 2(b) will likely play an ever-increasing role in international
loans and international bonds. There are certainly problems in this re-
gard on the European Continent caused by the broad interpretation of
section 2(b). The fall of eastern Europe's socialist countries and the rise
of a host of new states which are becoming members of the Agreement,
together with a scarcity of capital and the problems of many of these
states, will also likely lead to a host of new foreign exchange regulations,
which can only increase the importance of section 2(b) in the future.
